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COMMENTARY
PER SE RULES AGAINST VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS: DOWN BUT NOT OUT
EARL A. JINKINSON*
ROBERT G. FOSTER**
The rumors regarding the demise of per se rules are grossly exagger-
ated.' Per se rules, whether applied against price or "nonprice" vertical
or horizontal restraints, 2 are still very much alive. Obviously, the
Supreme Court's decision in Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc. 3 has had a substantial impact on the way lower courts perceive
and analyze per se rules. Nonetheless, the Authors contend that Sylva-
nia and subsequent decisions leave open several doors through which a
so-inclined lower court may easily return to this absolute and predict-
able world.4
Whether rightly or wrongly decided,5 the Sylvania decision has had
several practical effects. First, the decision immediately caused a rash
of summary dispositions in terminated distributor and dealer cases as
overcrowded federal courts quickly seized on its claimed import to
* Partner, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Iowa State University; LL.B., Stet-
son University.
** Partner, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, Illinois. B.S. magna cum laude, Loyola University,
1967; J.D., with honors, Northwestern University, 1970.
1. See, e.g., Stewart & Roberts at 727; Flynn at 767; McGee at 763-66; Bork, Vertical Re-
straints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 171.
2. This commentary is essentially limited to vertical restraints. It should not be inferred,
however, that the Authors necessarily agree with Stewart and Roberts or the other commentators
regarding their respective analyses of various horizontal restraints.
3. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980); California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Curiously, Stewart and Roberts totally
ignore the Supreme Court's decision in Mideal and relegate Catalano to an obscure footnote cita-
tion. Stewart & Roberts at 748 n.150.
5. Although tempted, the Authors will refrain from an extended critique of Sylvania. It
suffices to say that there is apparent merit in many of the critical comments on Sylvania by Profes-
sors Stewart, Roberts, and Flynn. On the other hand, the Authors see little substance in the state-
ments by Messrs. McGee and Noel regarding the rule of reason's service to the judiciary and their
claims that more just judicial determinations can be obtained through "additional time andmoney
expended in trial." McGee at 763 (emphasis added).
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clear burgeoning dockets.6 Sylvania's rush7 to overrule United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.8 pales in the light of this stampede. The pur-
ported "return to the rule of reason"9 may even result in the total de-
mise of the private antitrust lawsuit for the smaller or impecunious
plaintiff who cannot bear the costs of discovery or trial under the ex-
pensive and unclear 0 rule of reason standard.
Secondly, Sylvania was instantaneously subjected to the same genre
of academic criticism and practical aversion as its victim, Schwinn.
Much of this scorn is justified, of course, when the academic or practi-
tioner attempts to decipher the undefined extent of its application or
the meaning of an exception such as that for "demonstrable economic
effect.""
Third, the myriad of unanswered questions posed by Sylvania has
resulted in a morass of conflicting and sometimes unintelligible deci-
sions by district and circuit courts. On one side are decisions like Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp. 2 and Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.,'3 while on
6. Accord, Flynn at 786 n.52. This fact is readily apparent from even a cursory examination
of any recent trade regulation reporter. See, e.g., Determined Productions, Inc. v. R. Dakin &
Co., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 9163,063 (N.D. Cal.). Several circuit courts seem equally disposed
to summary dispositions. See, e.g., Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir.
1979).
7. Accord, Stewart & Roberts, at 729; Flynn at 769.
8. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). As a former chief of the Southern (1948-52) and Midwest (1953-64)
offices of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and chief trial counsel in Schwinn,
one of the Authors instinctively supports the Court's decision and bristles at any distortion of the
trial record. At the risk of appearing overly defensive, however, this Author will likewise leave it
to the other commentators in this series to review Schwinn.
Three comments are nonetheless warranted. First, Stewart and Roberts are incorrect when they
assert that "the Government did not proffer a per se illegality standard ... at trial .... " Stew-
art & Roberts at 730. The Government not only offered extensive evidence of per se price-fixing,
but also contended that the totality of conspiratorial restraints constituted a per se violation.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 325 (N.D. Ill. 1965), rev'd, 388 U.S.
365 (1967). With all due respect, Professor Posner, who argued the appeal, simply ignored this
ample evidence and argued a different theory. Second, the comments by Messrs. McGee and
Noel regarding Schwinn must be tempered by their practical predispositions as defense counsel
(eg., the reference to how the rule of reason was "ravagedin Schwinn by the Warren Court's zeal
forperse oversimplification"). McGee at 766. (emphasis added). Third, the comments by Profes-
sor Flynn must likewise be evaluated in the light of his academic idealism (e.g., the caustic refer-
ences to the "Burger Court" and its "unartful and inappropriate exercise of judicial process").
Flynn at 770.
9. McGee at 763.
10. See generally Stewart & Roberts at 728, n.6.
1I. 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
12. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
13. 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
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the other stand cases such as Pitchford Scientfic Instruments Corp. v.
Pep4 Inc. 14 and In re Coca-Cola Co. '5 Decisions such as Cernuto, Inc.
v. United Cabinet Corp. 6 and General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side
Winery 7 fall somewhere in between.
As a result of this confusion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict with any certainty the disposition of any given restraint in any
given district or circuit court. Trial lawyers therefore must throw up
their hands when confronted by typical clients with the typical ques-
tions regarding expected courtroom results. Predictability should not
be an end in itself, but some degree of assurance is necessary in order to
rationally conduct one's day-to-day business.
Despite all this confusion and uncertainty, the congressional intent to
encourage private antitrust litigation remains. The Authors therefore
contend that the application of certain per se rules is critical to both the
preservation of the private antitrust lawsuit and the general economic
welfare. The purpose of this commentary is to demonstrate the contin-
ued vitality of per se rules as applied to various vertical restraints.
I. CUSTOMER AND TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
Undaunted by Schwinn's apparent breadth,' 8 various lower courts
delighted defense counsel by devising means and arguments to avoid
per se proscription on vertical customer and territorial restrictions. 19
As expected, post-Sylvania courts have demonstrated the same ingenu-
ity in developing various exceptions permitting a per se analysis instead
of the rule of reason. The following are five of the more frequently
employed exceptions.
A. "Demonstrable Economic Effect"
The Supreme Court in Sylvania stated that per se analysis is still
14. 435 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aI'dmem, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 981 (1979).
15. 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). Citing the passage of the "Soft Drink Interbrand Competition
Act," the Federal Trade Commission recently requested the D.C. Circuit to set aside its cease and
desist orders in the Coca-Cola and Pepsi Co. territorial bottling cases and to remand them to the
district court for dismissal.
16. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
17. 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. See 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
19. See generally ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting
Intrabrand Competition (1977).
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available for customer and territorial restrictions when a "departure
from the rule-of-reason . . . [is] based upon demonstrable economic
effect .. ."" In General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery2' the
Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court with the observation that
"plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to prove that this particu-
lar type of vertical [territorial] restriction justifies per se prohibition
'based upon demonstrable economic effect.' "22 Plaintiff's counsel was
then left the unenviable task of determining what kind of evidence
would satisfy this amorphous burden.
B. Dual Distribution Systems
The Court in Sylvania also noted that "[t]here may be occasional
problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restric-
tions originating in agreements among the retailers," and that "[t]here
is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category would be illegalper se
.23 Based on an often cited line of pre-Sylvania cases, 24 another
exception to rule of reason analysis has been carved out for dual distri-
bution systems, i e., the manufacturer or distributor competes with its
distributors or dealers by also selling to the next level of distribution.
The most typical situation is when the manufacturer sells to both its
distributors or dealers and retail customers. Given such a dual distri-
bution system, several courts have held that what at first blush appears
to be a vertical customer or territorial restriction transforms into a hori-
zontal, per se restriction.2 5
20. 433 U.S. at 58-59.
21. 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
22. Id. at 1154. Accord West Texas Utils. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., [1979-2] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,851, at 78,925 (N.D. Tex.).
23. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28 (citations omitted).
24. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); Pitchford Scientific
Instr. Co. v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); American Motor
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T.
Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Interphoto Corp. v.
Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), af'dper curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
25. See, e.g., Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,696,
at 77,900 (S.D.N.Y.); Pitchford Scientific Instr. Co. v. Pepi, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
a/'dmem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). Cf. Guild Wineries &
Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son, [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,258, at 78,266 (Cal. App. Ct.)
(under California Cartwright Act). The FTC is presently planning a test case concerning a dual




C. Part of a Price-Fixing or Resale Price Maintenance Scheme
The Sylvania Court left another door ajar when it commented:
"Most important was the jury's rejection of the allegation that the loca-
tion restriction was part of a larger scheme to fix prices."' 26 Quoting
that language or citing from a long line of pre-Sylvania precedent,27
including Schwinn,28 several post-Sylvania courts have held that per se
analysis is justified in analyzing customer and territorial restrictions
that are a part of, or ancillary to, a price-fixing or resale price mainte-
nance scheme.29
D. Conspiracy, Agreement, or Cooperation Having 4 Horizontal
Effect or Impact
A fourth exception to rule of reason analysis stresses the conspiracy,
agreement, or cooperation among a manufacturer and its distributors,
and takes root in several pre-Sylvania decisions involving both territo-
rial and/or customer restrictions and group boycotts or concerted re-
fusals to deal."° Several post-Sylvania decisions have fashioned this
26. 433 U.S. at 41 n.9.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Bowen v.
New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418
(9th Cir. 1975); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. 388 U.S. at 373, 375-76, 380.
29. Cernuto, Inc. v. United States Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); General Bever-
age Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978); H. L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pitchford Scientific Instrs.
Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 435 F.Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aj'dmen, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., [1979-21 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 62,764 (Cal. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980). The district court in Pitchford
stated:
In the case at bar .... it is manifest that defendant's territorial restrictions were part
and parcel of a comprehensive price-fixing policy. In the apt words of Judge Wisdom in
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 948 (C.A. 5, 1975), the defend-
ants' restraints "were ancillary to an illegal price fixing scheme."
435 F. Supp. 685, 689 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
The FTC also is planning a test case "to establish the proposition that vertical nonprice re-
straints are per se illegal when they contribute to the effectiveness of a system of price restraints."
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21, no. 968, June 12, 1980.
30. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Bowen v. New
York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co.,
323 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1963). The Ninth Circuit stated in Walker:
It may be. . .that such contracts, particularly when there is a "horizontal" understand-
ing among the distributors as well as a "vertical" one between the manufacturer and
each distributor, can be so anti-competitive, in purpose or effect, or both, as to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
323 F.2d at 7.
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exception,3' and the Third Circuit's opinion in Cernuto, Inc. v. United
States Cabinet Corp.32 is the most frequently quoted:
[I]f the action of a manufacturer or other supplier is taken at the direc-
tion of its customer, the restraint becomes primarily horizontal in nature
in that one customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the
power of a common supplier. Therefore, although the termination in
such a situation is, itself, a vertical restraint, the desired impact is horizon-
tal and on the dealer, not the manufacturer, level.33
E. Offensive Collateral Estoppel
Finally, innovative counsel may be able to use the doctrine of offen-
sive collateral estoppel to resurrect a pre-Sylvania per se holding. This
doctrine is grounded in the Supreme Court's decision in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore,34 and it was effectively employed against Coors' ter-
ritorial restrictions in A. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co. 35  In
Spriggs, a post-Sylvania decision, the state court held that Coors was
collaterally estopped by the per se findings on its territorial restrictions
31. See, e.g., Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 461 F.Supp. 627 (D. Colo. 1978);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 459 F.Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aj'd, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980);
Evanston Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs., Inc., 436 F.Supp. 1370 (N.D. I11. 1977).
The district court in Eiberger stated:
Therefore, where dealers enter into an implicit agreement effecting or implementing an
anticompetitive scheme, it makes no difference with respect to its illegality that Sony,
itself not a dealer, was the one whose acts were needed to put the program into effect.
When Sony's authorized dealers complained about discounters, defendant responded
by entering into an illegal conspiracy with them, the purpose of which was to discover
the sources of supply of the unauthorized dealers, and make it unprofitable for the
sources to continue. By debiting of the accounts of extraterritorial wholesalers of Sony
equipment, Sony made it impossible for such supplies to continue on a basis profitable
both to the reselling authorized dealer, and the discounter. In the words of the Supreme
Court in the General Motors case (384 U.S. at 145)... :
"There can be no doubt that the effect of the combination or conspiracy here
was to restrain trade and commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Elimination, by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the
market is a per se violation of the Act."
Therefore, we conclude that the defendant has also committed a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.
459 F.Supp. at 1284-85.
32. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979). Accord Alloy In'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., [1980-
1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,148, at 77,708 (7th Cir.).
33. 595 F.2d at 168.
34. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).




in two pre-Sylvania cases, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. 3 6
and Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC.
II. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Few propositions are clearer under the antitrust laws than the per se
illegality of resale price maintenance.38 Even Professors Bork and Pos-
ner would concede that any post-Sylvania doubt39 regarding the con-
tinued per se illegality of vertical resale price maintenance was laid to
36. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1974). Coors, somewhat upset by
this novel theory, unsuccessfully filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court in which it
cited two post-Sylvania decisions where Coors' territorial restrictions had been upheld. See Del
Rio Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979);
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1977).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940): "[A] combi-
nation formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabi-
lizing the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se."
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975),
cen. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976), aptly summarizes the following Supreme Court decisions hold-
ing that price-fixing or retail price maintenance is per se illegal: United States v. Topco Assocs.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927);
Dr, Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Other decisions which
could be added to that list include: Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Sons, Inc.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85
(1920).
The circuit court decisions upholding the per se illegality of price-fixing or resale price mainte-
nance are simply legion. Some of the most frequently cited are: Cernuto, Inc. v. United States
Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th
Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); Tamaron Distrib. Corp. v. Weiner, 418 F.2d 137 (7th Cir.
1969); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964);
Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963); George W. Warner &
Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960); A.C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp.,
272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959). The Eighth Circuit's decision in Arnott v. American Oil Co., [1979-21
Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,967 (8th Cir.), and the Seventh Circuit's soon to be published opinion in
Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., No. 80-1081 (7th Cir. July 29, 1980), are recent
additions to this long line of precedent.
39. The questions raised by Stewart and Roberts are themselves subject to serious scrutiny in
light of their total disregard of Midcai. Even McGee and Noel concede that "a substantial body
of case law indicates that vertical price restraint, i.e., resale price maintenance, is per se illegal."
McGee at 763 n.4.
As previously noted, Stewart and Roberts also relegate the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980), to an obscure footnote, despite a refer-
ence in their introductory paragraph to S'ylvania's possible effect on horizontal price-fixing. Stew-
art & Roberts at 728.
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rest" by the Supreme Court's recent decision in California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.41  Justice Powell, the
spokesman for the majority in Sylvania,42 wrote the following observa-
tion on behalf of the 8-0 Court in Midcal:
This Court has ruled consistently that resale price maintenance illegally
restrains trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 407 (1911), the Court observed that such arrangements are "designed
to maintain prices . . . , and to prevent competition among those who
trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968) ...
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale price
maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act .... The wine producer
holds the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out in Dr. Miles,
such vertical control destroys horizontal competition as if wholesalers
"formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions
. . . by agreement with each other."43
If the doctrine of stare decisis means anything," vertical resale price
maintenance will continue to be per se illegal. Any decision to the con-
trary by the Supreme Court would require overruling Midcal and a
plethora of prior decisions,45 and would strike a devastating blow to
this country's competitive system.46 "[T]he aim and result of every
40. Anthony V. Nanni, Chief of the Trial Section of the Antitrust Division, recently declared
that Midcal and Catalano demonstrate that "the per se rule is alive and as strong as ever." ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3, no. 986, Oct. 23, 1980. Sanford M. Litvack, Chief of the
Antitrust Division, has announced that the Division intends to concentrate on vertical resale price
maintenance. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) AA-I, no. 975, July 31, 1980.
41. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
42. Sylvania, of course, was limited to "nonprice vertical restrictions" and expressly noted
that "It]he per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years and
involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy." 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
43. 445 U.S. at 102-03 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As correctly noted by McGee at
763 n.4, the correct or more accurate term for vertical price-fixing is resale price maintenance.
44. The Fifth Circuit declared in Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976), that "[n]o rule under that 'charter of liberty' is more firmly
established than the ban on price-fixing." 517 F.2d at 647.
45. See note 38 supra. The guidelines proposed by Stewart and Roberts would likewise re-
quire the reversal or modification of a substantial portion of this precedent. In addition, their
guidelines are impractical and raise far more difficulties than they resolve.
46: Price is the "central nervous system of the economy." United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940). Accord, National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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price-fixing agreement. . . is the elimination of one form of competi-
tion."47
III. MAXIMUM VERTICAL PRICE RESTRICTIONS
The per se prohibition against maximum vertical price restrictions is
based on two Supreme Court decisions, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc.4' and Albrecht v. Herald Co.4 9 Any post-Sylva-
nia doubt5" regarding continued per se illegality was somewhat as-
suaged by the citation of both decisions by the unanimous Court in
47. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
48. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
49. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). Justice White, speaking for the majority, reasoned as follows:
We think Kiefer-Stewart was correctly decided and we adhere to it. Maximum and
minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations. But schemes
to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of the seller for
the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to
compete and survive in that market. Competition, even in a single product, is not cast in
a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services
essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or to furnish services and
conveniences which consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum
price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged
dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. Moreover,
if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed
maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the ac-
tual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement
fixing minimum prices. It is our view, therefore, that the combination formed by the
respondent in this case to force petitioner to maintain a specified price for the resale of
the newspapers which he had purchased from respondent constituted, without more, an
illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The assertion that illegal price fixing is justified because it blunts the pernicious conse-
quences of another distribution practice is unpersuasive.
Id. at 152-54. Accord, Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273, 274, 276-78 (1st Cir.), cert.
dismissed. 389 U.S. 801 (1967); Crane Distrib. Co. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 267 F.2d 343, 345 (6th
Cir. 1959); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
50. The Authors disagree with the critical comments of Stewart and Roberts and their asser-
tion that Svlpania puts the Aibrecht case "in serious question." Stewart & Roberts at 742. The
Authors would not want to appear before the Supreme Court and argue to Justice White that his
opinion in Albrecht was "absurd" and that "Itihe per se rule, as applied to vertical maximum
pricing, was never justified... " 1d. at 760-61.
The Authors tend to agree, however, with Stewart and Roberts regarding their comment on the
"questionable" nature of Colgate and their characterization of Newberry as "an extremely puz-
zling opinion." Id. at 743-44. It should nonetheless be noted that Colgate has received increasing
approval in recent lower court opinions. See generally Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., [1979-21
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,890, at 79,157 (5th Cir.). The FTC has filed an action against Russell
Stover Candies "aimed at testing the continued validity of the Colgate doctrine." ANTrrRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-9, no. 972, July 10, 1980.
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Midcal5 t Although maximum vertical price restrictions are not regu-
larly employed and recent precedent is somewhat rare,52 there is little
indication that the Supreme Court intends to back away from its un-
equivocal per se holdings in Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht.
IV. BOYCOTrS/CONCERTED REFUSALS To DEAL
As the Ninth Circuit declared in Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager
Brewing Co., "[giroup boycotts are just as illegal under the Sherman
Act as group price fixing."53 The pre-Sylvania decisions finding per se
illegality are legion. 4 The post-Sylvania decisions are equally pro-
fuse,55 and court after court has either expressly56 or impliedly 57 held
that Sylvania has had no effect on per se illegality.
The dispositive question regarding the per se illegality of a boycott or
concerted refusal to deal is not whether it is vertical or horizontal,58 but
51. 445 U.S. at 102-03. Albrecht is cited twice and Kiefer-Stewart once.
52. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1193 n.2 (1st Cir. 1979).
53. 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963) (citations omitted).
54. The most frequently cited Supreme Court decisions are United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Fashion Originators' Guild of
Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See generally St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S.
531 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,438 (7th Cir.);
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Federal
Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 63,178
(D.D.C.); Weser v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, [1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,740 (N.D. 111.);
Evanston Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. I11. 1977).
56. See, e.g., Cernuto, Inc. v. United States Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166-67 n.15 (3d Cir.
1979); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,790 (4th
Cir.).
57. Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee, 624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.
1980); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
62,589, at 77,402 (3d Cir.); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 1008 F. Supp.
487 (N.D. IlI. 1980); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, [1980-1]
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,178, at 77,864 (D.D.C.); Weser v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, [1979-2]
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,740, at 78,182 (N.D. Ill.); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 461 F.
Supp. 627, 636 (D. Colo. 1978); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp,, 449
F. Supp. 1158, 1176 (D. Hawaii 1978); Evanston Motor Co. v. Mid-Southern Toyota Distribs.,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (N.D. I11. 1979).
58. Accord, Flynn at 788-89. The Authors strongly disagree with Stewart and Roberts' hori-
zontal/vertical distinction and suggest that the Second Circuit's decision in Oreck Corp. v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), is an aberration,
which does not comport with the Supreme Court's decisions in Klor's and General.Molors, supra





whether it falls within the following three categories enunciated by the
Fifth Circuit in E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
Manual Comm. :59
[1] horizontal combinations among traders at one level of distribution,
whose purpose was to exclude direct competitors from the market....
[2] vertical combinations among traders at different marketing levels,
designed to exclude from the market direct competitors of some members
of the combination. . . . [and 31 combinations designed to influence coer-
cively the trade practices of boycott victims, rather than eliminate them as
competitors .... 60
The vast majority of courts, whether pre- or post-Sylvania, have held
that any horizontal or vertical boycott that falls within these three cate-
gories is per se illegal.
V. CONCLUSION
To the practitioner who thinks that per se rules against vertical price
or nonprice restraints are a thing of the past: You may be sadly or
happily surprised, depending on whom you represent. Academic spec-
ulation and proposals are harmless and may even provide helpful in-
sights. Your client's pocketbook and freedom are far more serious
matters.
59. 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973). Accord, Smith v. Pro
Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Weser v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n,
[1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62, 740, at 78,182 (N.D. Ill.); Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory
Therapy, [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,497, at 76,907 (N.D. IL.).
60. 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973)(emphasis ad-
ded)(citations omitted).
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